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Should Terrorism Be
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Luz E. Nagle*
I appreciate the opportunity to read and comment upon Professor Naomi
Norberg's examination of the relationship between terrorism and international
criminal law.' The papers delivered at this symposium and the themes proffered
show us just how expansive are the issues evolving in the realm of international
criminal justice. At the same time, Professor Norberg's work and that of other
presenters at this forum demonstrate how open discussion of specific topics of
international criminal law compel thoughtful legal scholars to ruminate on how
preserving the rule of law in the international arena remains a complicated and
fragile proposition requiring international vigilance and cooperative stewardship.
Professor Norberg gives us much to consider in her discussion of whether
terrorism should or can be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court and other criminal tribunals having universal jurisdiction. She takes the
position that it does not, arguing that terrorism fails to merit ICC jurisdiction
because it is a crime yet to be defined due to politics. She furthers this argument by
stating that the ICC "would be hard pressed to fulfill the goals of deterrence and
justice for victims,"'2 and that in trying to do so some nations might respond to
internal and external terrorist threats by erecting barriers to suppress fundamental
rights "in the name of combating what seems to have become the 'crime of crimes'
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the excellent support and helpful comments of Research Assistant Sarah A. Cohen in the
preparation of this article for publication.
1. Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a Future
Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 11 (2009).
2. Id. at 14.
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of the 21 " century." 3 Professor Norberg reaches these conclusions by looking at the
differences between international and transnational crimes, by examining various
definitions, at times tainted by politics, that give terrorism an unpredictable and
unforeseeable application of ICC norms, and by considering responses from the
United States and that United Nations Security Council. The responses instead of
fulfilling the goals of international criminal law, are counter to the principles of the
ICC because they have resulted in violations of human rights. She also includes a
very interesting discussion of how an "international state of emergency" triggered
by the events of September 11, 2001, has generated worldwide extensive, severe
legislation internationalizing a crime that is mainly "set deep within national
borders.
'A
My comments address the following points of Professor Norberg's paper: 1) the
distinctions between international and transnational crimes; 2) how terrorism
should be defined for purposes of universal adjudication; 3) how governments with
totalitarian leanings have used the occurrence of terrorist acts to promulgate
legislation that could be construed as oppressive and in violation of human rights,
and; 4) how terrorism is being fought with immigration law.
Professor Norberg's differentiation between international crimes and
transnational crimes is vital to the theme of her paper, but in my opinion, invites
more in-depth treatment. She bases the differences on precise definitions of the
conducts prohibited and international consensus as to what constitutes crimes
against humanity as recognized under international law. While I think that the
differences addressed by Professor Norberg are very well presented, there are some
other points worthy of her attention.
Professor Norberg asserts that societies' essential values compel designating a
conduct as a crime, and therefore, criminal law is a barometer of values that
applies in both domestic and international criminal law. Applying the barometer to
the events of World War II, she submits that genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes became international crimes by consensus of the international
community "as to the values protected by those prohibitions." 5 In this regard, I
would suggest that it is not a consensus, but rather, a shared understanding of
3. Id.
4. Id. at 12-13.
5. Id. at 15.
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patterns of expectations that compel nations to delineate what constitutes
international crimes.'
Customary international law,7 embodies "inherent values and interests of the
community of nations" . It dictates that conduct violating basic human rights in
ways that "deeply shock the conscience of humanity" 9 constitutes international
crimes "of concern to the 'international community as a whole'."' 0 International
expectation to criminalize such behavior is then reached by virtue of the values
protected and the interests threatened. The values and interests transcend
individual goals, national borders, and sovereignty limitations because they are
common to and affect all nations equally. Even if they occur in a few nations, the
immediate and direct effect of international crimes endangers the well being,
peace, and security of all mankind."
In such events, the international community, through the authority of the United
Nations Security Council, 12 acquires a legitimate right to intrude in the sacrosanct
6. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 107 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1999) ("It may be that all rules of international law involve legitimate expectations.
Apart from the role played by acquiescence, rules of customary international law involve
legitimate expectations because any change from a voluntary pattern of behavior to a
customary rule involves the transformation and legitimi[z]ation of patterns of behavior,
around which expectations of a legal character necessarily develop.").
7. See Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary International Law during Armed
Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 602 (2006) (noting that "Customary
international law is based in general and dynamic patterns of opinio juris and practice, but
when a customary norm comes into existence it is universally applicable.") (emphasis
omitted).
8. Otto Triffterer, Security Interests of the Community of States, Basis and Justification of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction versus 'Protection of National Security Information',
Article 72 Rome Statute, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
63 (Herwig Roggemann and Petar Sarcevic, eds., 2002).
9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 15, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/RomeStatuteICC/RomeICC preamble.html,
("[Djuring this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.").
10. Triffterer, supra note 8, at 63.
11. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 3; See also Triffterer, supra note 8, at 63. The ICC preamble
reads: "Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of
the world."
12. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with maintaining the
international peace and security by establishing peacekeepers, imposing economic
sanctions, authorizing military action under UN Charter Article 16, and issuing resolutions
establishing ad-hoc tribunals for international prosecutors to investigate international
crimes. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Use Courts, Not Combat, to Get the Bad Guys: Pre-
emptive Justice, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 20, 2003, at 9, available at
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sovereignty of a nation, and may take such punitive measures as economic
sanctions, use of force, establishing an ad-hoc tribunal, or authorizing a national or
international force to arrest an indicted suspect.' 3
International law provides for universality in order to prevent damage to the
international community and to avoid impunity for those committing core crimes. 
14
This, in turn, triggers an international duty to prosecute those accused of
committing serious crimes, regardless of whether they are in violation of the
domestic law of the country wherein the crimes are perpetrated. This duty is well
illustrated in the case of Klaus Barbie, in which the French Court of Appeals
dismissed the defendant's argument that his extradition to France rendered his
detention and indictment null on the basis of the manner in which he was
transferred. According to the Court the international crime with which Barbie had
been charged rendered him subject to an international legal order to which notions
of frontiers and extradition rules arising there from were completely foreign.'
5
On the other hand, the criminalization of conduct as transnational crimes
emerges from the concerns of individual states regarding their "political, social and
economic interests ... and assertions about the harm caused to these
interests ....,,16 For instance, money laundering is seen as a crime that erodes
financial institutions, depresses economic growth, facilitates corruption, and
increases economic instability; 17 while drug trafficking threatens public safety,
economic productivity, public health, professional advancement and education,
and public institutions. 18
http://www.princeton.edu/-slaughtr/Commentary/CourtsNotCombat.pdf (noting that the
Security Council also has the power to create ad-hoc tribunals for those nations that have
yet to be part of the ICC).
13. See generally Id.
14. See generally Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] (describing crimes derived from
Nuremberg as crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
15. Au Nom Du Peuple Francais, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, (Fr.), No. 85-95166,
(Dec. 20, 1985) available at http://www.trial-
ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/barbiel985.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2009).
16. Neil Boister, 'Transnational Criminal Law?' 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 953,957 (2003).
17. See Brent L. Barlett, The Negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development
(May 2002) (unpublished article, on file at International Economics Groups webpage)
available at http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/anti-money-
laundering/documents/moneylaunderingnegeffects.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
18. See Zarina Othman, Myanmar, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Security Implications, 65
AKADEMIKA 27, 31 (2004), available at
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The interests protected by the criminalization of terrorism include human rights,
legitimately formed governments, political processes of the State, and international
peace and security. 19 The questions here are: Are these interests regarding conduct
violating basic human rights in a manner that "deeply shocks the conscience of
humanity" interests of the international community as a whole,2 ° as is understood
for the core crimes? Are these interests generally recognized by all nations and
acknowledged and applied in a consistent fashion? In other words, has terrorism
reached the level of customary international law so as to claim that it is an
international crime and not a transnational crime? Professor Norberg thinks not,
and I tend to agree with her.
As stated clearly in the United States' Supreme Court case of The Paquete
Habana,21 through the passage of time, "what originally may have rested in...
comity, courtesy or concession, [eventually grew into] general assent of civilized
nations, into a settled rule of international law." 22 The practices and customs of
states regarding terrorism are inconsistent, and the rules applied to terrorism are
yet to be settled through the "general assent" of nations. Yes, various events at
different times in history have driven the international community to criminalize
diverse expressions of terrorism 23 and to disapprove terrorism as a human rights
http://pkukmweb.ukm.my/-penerbit/akademika/ACROBATAKADEMIKA65/akademika65
%5B02%5D.pdf (discussing how drug trafficking threatens civil society) (Malay).
19. See BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10, 27, 37 (2006).
According to Saul, the international community disapproves of terrorism on several grounds
beyond it being a serious human rights violation. Id. at 27. Terrorism undermines the State
and peaceful political processes, and threatens international peace and security. Id. Saul
affirms that even if several United Nations' resolutions implied that self determination
movements were excluded from the notion of terrorism, today the international community
agrees, "that all 'acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
wherever and by whoever committed,' are both criminal an unjustifiable." Id. at 37.
20. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 3.
21. The Paquete Habana, 20 S. Ct. 290, 297 (1900). See also GREGORY E. MAGGs, TERRORISM
AND THE LAW 41 (West 2005).
22. Paquete Habana, 20 S. Ct. at 297.
23. See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 33-35 (Giuseppe Nesi ed.,
Ashgate Pub. Ltd. 2006); see also RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIALS 186-187 (2009). The first attempt to
criminalize diverse expressions of terrorism was by the League of Nations following the
1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia by Croatian separatists. Nesi, at 34.
India is the only nation to ratify the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism. The Convention paved the way for later instruments addressing terrorist offenses
such as acts committed aboard aircraft, crimes against internationally protected persons,
hostage-taking, crimes involving maritime navigation, crimes involving nuclear material,
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violation, and as a threat to peace and security. 24 However, there is no international
expectation as to what constitutes a terrorist act,25 or what "terrorist acts" concern
the international community and violate human rights such as to deeply shock the
conscience of humanity. Will bombings in Colombia of a fitness club in Bogota
and the detonation of two hundred kilograms of explosives near a bullring in
Medellin qualify as terrorist acts? Will bombings by the Basque separatist group
ETA of the Guardia Civil police barracks in Barcelona qualify, or will an armed
attack by illegal armed groups on Indonesian village? 26 Will the restaurant
bombing in Spain that killed eighteen U.S. servicemen and injured eighty-three
people27 or the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
qualify? Lack of agreement as to what constitutes terrorism is demonstrated by the
failure of numerous nations to ratify many terrorist conventions, by the diverse
definitions of terrorism, by the wide gap in the several definitions,28 and by
continuing disagreement over whether certain conduct can be construed as
and the financing of terrorism. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM, at
33-34.
24. See SAUL, supra note 19, at 28-30 nn.135-150 for a comprehensive compilation of
instruments considering terrorism as a threat to human rights and to peace and security.
25. There are numerous documents and databases with lists of terrorist incidents. Yet, there is
no uniformity in the methodology used to determine if an act was/is terrorism or some other
form of political violence. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, A
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM FOR 2004, at vii (2005),
http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/2004nctcchronology.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (stating that
the United States includes an incident as terrorist if it "was premeditated, perpetrated by a
subnational or clandestine agent, politically motivated, potentially including religious,
philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations, violent, and perpetrated against a
noncombatant target." It is international if the incident involves citizens or territory of more
than one country.). Comparing the information offered one can see that some
documents/databases contain incidents that others ignore. See, e.g. Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System, http://wits.nctc.gov (follow "Central and South America" hyperlink; then
follow "Columbia" hyperlink) (showing a total of 2,293 incidents in Colombia between
2004 and 2008) (last visited Sep. 20, 2009).
26. Looking at several diverse lists of worldwide terrorists' acts, one can see how many acts are
labeled as terrorism that perhaps should not be labeled as such. See Wm. Robert Johnston,
Selected Terrorist Incidents Worldwide through September 2000,
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorisn/wjp255b.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). See
also TripAtlas.com, List of Terrorist Attacks, http://tripatlas.com/Terrorist-attack (last
visited Mar. 6, 2009).
27. See U.S. DEP'T of State, SIGNIFICANT TERRORISTS INCIDENTS, 1961-2003: A BRIEF
CHRONOLOGY, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm (2004) (stating that a
restaurant near a U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain was bombed on April 12, 1984).
28. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 23, at 33-35
(noting that the OAS Convention only refers to the crimes against internationally protected
persons, while the Islamic Convention includes certain intents as an element of the crime).
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terrorist. 29 Information on terrorist acts is frequently deficient, because time "fact
patterns are open to interpretation, and perpetrators' intent is rarely clear., 30 As
such, unsettled, ambiguous and subjective definitions continue to evolve resulting
in the proliferation of definitions. 3' This struggle is also expressed in court
decisions, 32 United Nations resolutions, 33 and even within domestic legislation.
34
I agree with Professor Norberg's assessment that definitions based on the notion
that terrorists intimidate or terrorize the masses are counterproductive, and that
terrorism is more analogous to random acts of violence subject to domestic
criminal law. This makes deciding what constitutes a terrorist act "more art than
science. 35 I will add to Professor Norberg's section on the definition of terrorism
is "a tactic, used on many fronts, by diverse perpetrators in different circumstances
and with different aims."
36
I do not, however, entirely agree with Professor Norberg's statement that
terrorism is of a war-like character with the capacity for immediate mass
29. See, e.g., Organization of the Islamic Conference, Convention of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on Combating Terrorism, Annex, Res. No. 59/26-P (Jul. 1, 1999),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de5e6646.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2009) ("Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression,
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with
the principles of international law shall not be considered as a terrorism crime.").
30. National Counterterrorism Center, Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of
Terrorist Incidents, http://wits.nctc.gov/Methodology.do [hereinafter Methodology](last
visited Sep. 20, 2009).
31. See generally HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-46 (2005) (offering an excellent compendium and in depth
analysis of the many definitions by the League of Nations, the United Nations, and regional
organizations).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Confusion on the
definition of 'terrorism' abounds" because [t]errorism is defined variously by the
perpetrators' motives, methods, targets, and victims."). See also MAGGS, supra note 21, at
1.
33. See, e.g., The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations Among Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) (stating that armed and violent acts do not constitute
terrorism if they are committed when seeking self-determination in opposition to violently
enforced occupation).
34. See MAGGS, supra note 21, at 1 (citing to Nicholas J. Perry's findings of twenty-two
different definitions of terrorism just in the U.S. federal law).
35. Methodology, supra note 30.
36. See SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 23, at 185 (noting that to some, terrorism is a
"concept with a colloquial meaning"); JONATHAN R. WHiTE, TERRORISM IN TRANSITION
66 (Philip Reichel ed., Sage 2005) (noting that terrorism is a "political activity involving
crime" that changes "with historical circumstances and the political environment").
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destruction, 37 because not every war-like event with immediate capacity for mass
destruction constitutes terrorism. Terrorism is something of a two-step
phenomenon. The first step concerns the commission of the violent act and the
second step involves determining if the goal for resorting to terrorism is primarily
to influence a government or to attain some other objective.38 Here we find great
discrepancy and disagreement. For some analysts, the extent of the psychological
impact of violence committed determines if the act is terrorism. 39 For others, such
as former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan, terrorism is determined by
the extent of the physical damages caused:
Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to
civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any.
40
Even if both criminals and terrorists use violence on a level we perceive as
being "terrorism," their motivation and the reach of the effects caused are
dissimilar. The criminals' primary and direct motivation is egocentric and personal
and is often a matter of obtaining or protecting material gain, while the primary
and direct aim of the terrorists' violence is political or ideological and intended to
influence public opinion and eventually change "the system., 41 Many terrorist acts
are within one nation's borders and the psychological fear and primary aim effects
are limited. A review of the various reports on terrorist acts shows that many
incidents reported as terrorist in character, while being highly violent, are more
criminal in intent than terrorist, and this leads to some confusion over the primary
and direct motivation of the group using violent acts.42
37. Norberg, supra note 1, at 20.
38. See generally Press Release, National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC Fact Sheet and
Observations Related to 2005 Terrorist Incidents 4, available at
http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/nctcfactsheetandpressslides_2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009)
(stating that the United States defines terrorism as politically motivated acts against non-
combatants).
39. See for example, Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism As Impennissible Political Violence: An
International Framework, 16 VT. L. REv. 461, 476 (1992), noting that "Terrorist violence is
intended to inflict psychological trauma and to subvert government, if not democratic
capitalism itself"
40. Secretary-General Offers Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism, in Address to Madrid
Summit, Press Release, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9757 (Mar. 10, 2005). See also Alex Schmid,
Terrorism-The Definitional Problem, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 419 (2004).
41. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 41-42 (Colun. U. Press 1998).
42. Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar primarily used violence to defend his wealth and desire
to remain in Colombia, even though his acts were termed narcoterrorism. For a popular,
comprehensive, though not particularly accurate, depiction of the life and times of Pablo
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The infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar committed extreme violence, terrorized
innocent citizens, and caused widespread destruction in an effort to break the will
of the Colombian government to extradite him to the United States to face
justice. a3 His wanton attacks bore all the hallmarks of what we think of as being
terrorism, and established the term, narcoterrorism, and the popular lexicon. Yet,
it was not terrorism per se because Escobar's immediate aim was not to terrorize
for political reasons or convictions, but to protect his wealth and freedom.
45
Certainly his form of violence had a war-like character that caused the nation to act
in self-defense,46 but his reign of terror could not be truly labeled terrorism.
I also do not agree with Professor Norberg's statement that "terrorism tends to
be an indirect and impersonal crime. ' '47 Terrorism is the embodiment of evil and a
Escobar, see generally MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD'S
GREATEST OUTLAW (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). Some analysts also claim that Latin
America's oldest insurgent group, Colombia's notorious FARC guerrillas, is nothing more
than a criminal organization using violent tactics to hold onto its vast wealth acquired
through traditional criminal conducts, and that any political ideology or goals the group
may have once had were abandoned long ago. See Michael Radu, The Perilous
Appeasement of Guerrillas, ORBIS 44:3:362-379 (2000), and also Luz E. Nagle, Global
Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia's Legal War against Illegal Armed Groups, 15
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 85-86 (2005), and Luz E. Nagle, Colombian
Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know about the Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO.
IMMGR. L.J. 441, 454 (2004).
43. See generally MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD'S GREATEST
OUTLAW (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).
44. The term is attributed to former Peruvian President Belaunde Terry. See G. Davidson
Smith, Commentary No. 13: Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in
Colombia, CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, Oct. 1991, at 1.
45. See HOFFMAN, supra note 41, at 37.
46. See Terry D. Gill, The Eleventh of September and Right of Self-Defense, in TERRORISM
AND THE MILITARY: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 23-27 (Wybo P. Heere, ed.,
TMC Asser 2003).
47. This quotation is from the earlier draft of Naomi Norberg's article, which stated:
Terrorism, however, tends to be an indirect, impersonal crime. Targets may of
course be chosen on the basis of nationality (the American embassies
simultaneously bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, the tourists asked if they were
British or American during the 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks), or presumed
nationality (the World Trade Center or a London bus). But among the victims may
be persons of other nationalities, and the purpose of the attack may in fact not be to
destroy the group, but to express political or other ideological disagreement with a
particular state. Victims are thus merely symbols. In fact, the first post-Reign of
Terror definition of terrorism reflects this anti-state character.
Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a Future
Together 9 (Feb 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Santa Clara Journal of
International Law).
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direct and personal crime because terrorists target individuals, groups, and property
that will yield the most far-reaching psychological repercussions well beyond the
immediate target. This is precisely why Timothy McVeigh targeted the Murrah
Federal Building, Islamic terrorists targeted the New York World Trade Center and
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the Mumbai terrorists targeted a well-
known and historic hotel serving international business travelers. Like Professor
Norberg, I see a difference between transnational crimes (drug trafficking and
laundering), and terrorism, however, to me the difference is rooted in the primary
goal that individuals have in committing specific crime. In transnational crimes,
the motivation is personal aggrandizement, while the terrorist's motivation is
fundamentally altruistic, whether real or imagined. 48 "A terrorist without a cause is
not a terrorist.,
49
I am also quite drawn to Professor Norberg's very interesting discussion of how
some nations cloak totalitarian tendencies in the guise of cooperating with other
states to fight both domestic and international terrorism, and would very much like
to have seen her expand on this in greater detail. It occurs to me, especially in the
aftermath of September 11, that more nations are imposing state-of-emergency
situations in order to implement forms of legislation that may be construed as
oppressive and which curtail or threaten to curtail human rights. Perhaps Professor
Norberg might consider a correlation made between pre-September 11 conditions
when nations were criticized, even by the United States, for legislating repressive
criminal sanctions, and post-September 11 conditions when states were praised for
promulgating such legislation in the name of being strong on terrorism. The
Security Council, in 2003, took note of the sea change in the attitudes of nations
toward international terrorism following September 11 when the simple truth that
"no country could prevent terrorism in isolation" became abundantly clear.5° In the
See also Norberg, supra note 1, at 21 ("Terrorism, particularly transnational, politically or
ideologically motivated terrorism, however, often has a more indirect quality.").
48. See HOFFMAN, supra note 41, at 43 ("The terrorist is fundamentally an altruist; he believes
that he is serving a 'good' cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider
constituency-whether real or imagined-that the terrorist and his organization purport to
represent. The criminal, by comparison, serves no cause at all, just his own personal
aggrandizement and material satiation.").
49. Id.
50. See Press Release, Security Council, Outgoing Chair of Security Council's Counter-
Terrorism Committee Says United Nations Now Centre of Global Anti-Terrorism Network,
U.N. Doc. SC/7718, (April 4, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7718.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2009)
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words of, then Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Jeremy
Greenstock, "It took a horrific terrorist act less than five miles from the Security
Council Chamber to shake the international community into adopting [Security
Council Resolution 1373's] legally binding, global standards." 5' National
legislation on fighting terrorism became a two-fold global effort, first, to align
national counter terrorism legislation with requirements set out in Resolution 1373;
and second, to identify ways to close gaps in national legislation while
"strengthening the law enforcement capacities of the State." 52
Moreover, the overall sentiment of members of the Security Council at that time
was that any Member State needing assistance to upgrade national legislation and
strengthen law enforcement capabilities should be able to have full access to
international resources.
Following September 11, a host of nations declared states of emergency.
While some used such measures as a consequence to implementing terrorist-
specific legislation, one could suggest that for a few nations, invoking a state of
emergency was little more than a pretext for oppressive regimes to exert
themselves, particularly by labeling groups as terrorists that would otherwise have
been nothing more than dissident groups. Chile is a current case in point. There,
the government is using its Anti-Terrorist Law, 53 first enacted during the Pinochet
dictatorship, to suppress a long-running indigenous autonomy movement by trying
a Mapuche dissident for arson on a private estate and for an alleged attack on a
Public Defender's office. 54 In announcing the charges, Chile's Interior Minister
stressed that the alleged acts show all the hallmarks of terrorism and warrant
invoking the Anti-Terrorist Law.55 The Observatory on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, a human rights organization monitoring the developments in Chile,
countered that the Anti-Terrorist Law is being applied inappropriately. "The
Mapuche people's struggle in support of their demands is not an act of
(referring to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which sets out steps and strategies
to combat terrorism and prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism).
51. Id.
52. See Id. (remarks by Security Council member Aleg Ivanou of Belarus).
53. Determina conductas terroristas y fija su penalidad, Ley N' 18.314 de 1984, modificada por
Ley No 19.241 del 28/08/1993 (1984) (Chile), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3db95a3a4.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
54. For a report on the pending trial of Miguel Tapia Huenulef, see Pamela Sepfilveda, Chile:
Indigenous Activist Arrested Under Anti-Terrorist Law, 1NTER PRESS SERVICE (Latin
America), Feb. 24, 2009.
55. Id.
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terrorism... In actual fact, there is no organization for the purpose of sowing fear
among the population, there is no organization that would commit those crimes
defined in law as terrorist crimes."
56
One point Professor Norberg makes regarding measures taken by oppressive
governments for which I would like to see greater discussion concerns the
application of immigration laws to fight terrorism. 57 I do not see that as a bad
thing, but rather as a "soft" alternative to employing use of force (while reducing
the risk associated with use of force of trampling on human rights) to fight
terrorism. Immigration policy changes cannot prevent terrorism. However, they are
key ingredients of the effort to combat terrorism. In the War on Terror, migrants
constitute little more than collateral damage. In order to differentiate real threats
from perceived threats, nations need to review their immigration policies and
implement comprehensive changes, considering in the process of doing so their
duty to protect the rights of immigrants and refugees. Immigration policies are the
checkpoint to: 1) facilitate the entry of foreigners whose presence is desired; and 2)
to identify and deter the entry of unwanted foreigners.
Carefully drafted policies could help deter future domestic terrorist attacks
without damaging other values. Such policies would address improving the
processing and issuing of visas, curbing unauthorized entries, and increasing
enforcement. As Professor Norberg put it so well, today, the immigration-terrorism
link, reinforced by post-2001 Security Council Resolutions, condones conflict
between the two, and is in sharp contrast to the world's response to the core
crimes. 58 Therefore, the ICC should not have jurisdiction over terrorism, because
doing so would not only condone, but exacerbate, the struggle between
immigration and terrorism.
In my view, terrorism has been fought with tools of law enforcement and not
with tools of administrative procedures. Many nations have used police forces to
locate and arrest suspected or perceived terrorists and have used their domestic
courts to try them. It is true that to some extent, there is greater vigilance at points
of entry, although one may argue that international borders are now more porous
than in the past. However, my own take is that we see nations trying to look more
carefully at who is violating immigration laws already established rather than
implementing new procedures to combat terrorism.
56. Id.
57. Norberg, supra note 1, at 39, 44-45.
58. Norberg, supra note 1, at 44-45.
Should Terrorism Be Subject to Universal Jurisdiction?
In the aftermath of September 11, several nations discovered that existing
immigration laws were not enforced and that the laws contained several loopholes
that could compromise a state's ability to secure its territory from illegal entries by
terrorists. In partial response to the breakdown in immigration enforcement in the
United States that contributed to the September 11 attacks, extensive measures
were undertaken in many nations to identify weaknesses in the laws that allowed
some of the terrorists to live and plot largely unnoticed on their soil.
59
For instance, in the United States, prior to September 11, the INS failed on
many occasions to register and track immigrants as required by law. This kept the
government in the dark as to the time aliens entered the United States, their place
of residence, or their time of exiting the country.60 Such a "lack of enforcement
was dangerous and ripe for abuse by aliens wishing to stay below the radar,
including terrorists.",
61
Germany also experienced a wake-up call when it realized that the 9/11
terrorists hatched their plot on German soil, and were able to do so largely by
taking advantage of Germany's "liberal asylum policies and the low levels of
surveillance by authorities. 62 In fact, the 9/11 hijackers enjoyed freedom of
movement in Germany for several years.
The fact that all of the terrorist hijackers who attacked the United States on
September 11 were aliens does not, of course, make all immigrants terrorists. But it
does, however, reveal that those terrorists exploited existing weaknesses in
59. According to Michael J. Garcia, head of U.S. Homeland Security's Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) immigration law is "an incredibly important piece of the
terrorism response." See Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool,
WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201441 .htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
60. See War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Comm. on the
Judiciary H. of Rep., 100th Cong. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement of Sen. John
N. Hostettler, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims) ("Since
the implementation of NSEERS in September 2002, more than 138,000 aliens from over
151 countries have been registered. NSEERS has resulted in the identification of t I aliens
linked to terrorism, the arrests of more than 120 criminal aliens and the issuance of more
than 12,000 charging documents placing deportable aliens in deportation proceedings. This
program is now run in DHS."),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju86954.000/hju86954_0f.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009).
61. Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. John N. Hostettler).
62. See FRANCIS T. MIKO & CHRISTIAN FROEHLICH, GERMANY'S ROLE IN FIGHTING
TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. RL32710, at
442-4 (2004), http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32710.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
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immigration laws and procedures, 63 and demonstrated an urgent need for changes
in policy and changes in the implementation of policy.
Some observers suggest that "terrorism has been fought largely with
immigration law,"64 and that doing so stigmatizes innocent individuals caught up
in the war on terrorism. 65 Yet, one must acknowledge that immigration policies are
key ingredients in the efforts to combat terrorism and are effective if the
implementation of such policies is evenhanded, if the laws are carefully drafted to
avoid further erosion on civil liberties, and if detentions solely based on someone
looking "Arab or Middle Eastern or Latino or other" can be avoided.66
Immigration policy changes alone cannot prevent terrorism. But, perhaps
immigration policy can be an effective "soft" alternative to employing use of force
while reducing the risk associated with use of force of trampling on human rights.
Overall, Professor Norberg raises several provocative topics warranting further
and more in-depth discussion. If she did not delve too deeply into some of the
subjects she covered due to time or page limitations, I would encourage her to
revisit those topics in greater detail, as I think doing so will attract a significant
amount of interest and lively debate.
63. Five of the 9/11 hijackers had "clear immigration violations," and one had a possible
violation. See STAFF OF THE NAT. COMMON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S., 9/11 AND
TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), http://www.9-
I Icommission.gov/staff statements/911_TerrTravMonograph.pdf (last visited Apr. 20,
2009).
64. Norberg, supra note 1, at 39.
65. For example, "Ali Alubeidy was caught up in an investigation of fraudulent Pennsylvania
commercial driver's licenses. It wasn't until after the attacks on New York and the
Pentagon that the FBI pursued his case as having a possible link to terrorism. Although the
connection soon unraveled, Alubeidy, an Iraqi immigrant, lives with the stigma." See Mary
Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at
AO1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201441 .html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
66. Hearing, supra note 60, at 8.
